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periodic reforms of company law. Every twenty years or so the Board of Trade
appoints a distinguished committee of experts to hold hearings and submit a
report. It would be naive to assume a complete absence of political considera-
tions. Yet the Cohen Committee's recommendations of 1945 were passed with
few changes under the sponsorship of the Labor Government of 1947 notwith-
standing that the committee had been appointed under the earlier Churchill
regime. With us, by contrast, it seems next to impossible to push through
major legislation like the SEC statutes except in times of crisis. And one who
ventures the suggestion that a free stock market can go down as well as up
is apt to be charged in some quarters with pulling down the pillars of the
Republic.
It will have become apparent by now that I view the publication of Profes-
sor Gower's book as a significant event in legal literature. I do think the
American reader should be warned about differences in terminology. The quip
to the effect that England and America are divided by a common language
becomes doubly true in the context of financial jargon. English lawyers speak
of "shares," not stock, 35 and "debentures" or "debenture stock" instead of
bonds.36 Our articles of incorporation and by-laws are to them the "memoran-
dum of association" and "articles of association." Stock dividends are generally
called "bonus shares" (not to be confused with the American use of this ex-
pression), although attempts have been made to popularize the term "plough-
shares," which is logical enough in view of the fact that undistributed profits
are thus permanently ploughed back.3 7 Paid-in or capital surplus goes into a
"share premium account," as we have seen. Earned surplus is, with less pre-
cision, called simply a "reserve."38 And, as if it were not confusing enough to
have to add columns of pounds, shillings and pence, the English complement
their habit of driving on the wrong side of the road by showing their assets
on the right of the balance sheet and their liabilities on the left.
For all this, of course, the author is not to blame. If an American law office
can afford one book on English company law, this is it.
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PROFESSOR William M. Beaney of the Department of Politics of Princeton
undertook this study in "an attempt to learn whether the right to counsel,
which is vital in criminal cases, is enjoyed as consistently and widely in the
35. "Shares" may be converted into "stock," which theoretically is freely divisible




tProfessor of Law, Harvard University.
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United States as the needs of justice require."1 His general conclusion is
that it is not-a conclusion shared by most persons familiar with the subject.
After an introductory chapter presenting the scope of his project, raising
pertinent questions to be answered, and indicating his own value assumptions,
Professor Beaney proceeds to sketch the historical background of the right
to counsel in English and American law. He then examines the right to
counsel in federal courts under the sixth amendment, and in state courts
under state constitutional and statutory provisions. He next considers the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as a safeguard of the right to counsel in state proceedings. He
closes with a chapter on the right to counsel in practice, and one summarizing
his conclusions.
As the selected bibliography appended to the volume demonstrates, much
has been written about the right to counsel. Professor Beaney adds very little
to what has already been said. He has, however, read the cases and relevant
literature carefully and it is useful to have this material analyzed and sum-
marized in a single volume.'
With respect to the problem of counsel in the federal courts Professor
Beaney concludes that, at least in legal theory, it is "substantially solved" by
virtue of the decisions in Johnson v. Zerbst 3 and Walker v. Johnston,4 and
rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 effective since 1946.
He is more critical of the status of the right to counsel in state prosecutions.
Under the prevailing interpretation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment the states are not required to appoint counsel for impecunious
defendants in non-capital cases unless an appraisal of the "totality of facts"
shows special circumstances rendering the trial unfair without legal assis-
tance.6 Professor Beaney believes that the "fair trial" test has proved difficult
to apply. "So many variables are included within its ill-defined limits that it
has failed to provide adequate guidance for state trial courts and has confused
state and federal courts called upon to review alleged denials of the right to
counsel."' 7 As a solution he proposes that the Supreme Court "either by
1. P. 1.
2. In terms of completeness of coverage the book is not as current as its publication
date would indicate. Although published in 1955, the preface was written in 1953 and
the latest case cited was decided in 1952.
3. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). This case established the proposition that if an accused in
a criminal case "is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently
waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to
a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty." Id. at 468.
4. 312 U.S. 275 (1941), holding that a plea of guilty by a defendant who had not
been informed of his right to counsel should not in itself be treated as a waiver of
counsel.
5. "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise him of
his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding
unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."




declaring that under modern conditions due process in criminal proceedings
requires counsel, unless waived, or by formulating a new application of its
fair trial doctrine, should take the firm position that a trial cannot be fair
unless counsel assists every defendant who wants or needs the aid of coun-
sel.... If our vaunted claim of 'equal justice under law' is to be more than
an idle pretense, the right to have counsel must be extended in practice to
all persons accused of crime."8
Professor Beaney attributes the Supreme Court's refusal to funnel sixth
amendment right to counsel into fourteenth amendment due process to two
factors: (1) A reluctance to extend federal power so as to affect the adminis-
tration of state criminal law so long as state procedures are not inconsistent
with fundamental fairness; (2) A desire to encourage the development of in-
dependent standards of fundamental rights and fairness. These factors are re-
inforced by the argument that historically the appointment of counsel was not
considered a fundamental right essential to the conduct of a fair trial."
Perhaps a more persuasive reason for the Court's refusal to extend the
fourteenth amendment to require court-appointed counsel in all cases for
indigents is the fear of an avalanche of habeas corpus petitions on behalf of
prisoners incarcerated after state trials in which they were not represented by
counsel.'0 This fear is not completely without foundation?' But the very un-
certainty of the "fair trial" doctrine requiring defendants to establish special
circumstances to entitle them to court-appointed counsel has encouraged
numerous petitions for habeas corpus. And if it is assumed that the right to
counsel is fundamental, pressing administrative considerations should not jus-
tify a refusal to vindicate basic rights.
There is a bewildering incongruity, not elaborated by Professor Beaney, in
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
makes a distinction, which frequently goes unnoticed, between the right to
court-appointed aid and the right to self-chosen counsel. Although there is
8. P. 234.
9. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court's analysis of early state con-
stitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel convinced it that they ".. . were
intended to do away with rules which denied representation, in whole or in part, by
counsel in criminal prosecutions, but were not aimed to compel the State to provide
counsel for a defendant." Id. at 466. For a sharp criticism of this view, see Becker &
Heidelbaugh, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, 28 Noma DAmE LAw. 351 (1953).
10. This fear is rarely articulated. However, in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134
(1947), the Court stated that the recognition of the claim that due process requires coun-
sel to be appointed for all indigent defendants in state criminal proceedings "... . would
furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the prison doors of the
land." Id. at 139.
11. Following Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), a large number of petitions
for habeas corpus. based upon an alleged denial of counsel, were filed by federal prisoners.
In the district that includes Alcatraz Penitentiary, for example, 75 such petitions were
filed in the ensuing three years. See Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counscl in
Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. Rrv. 559, 571, (1951).
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no right to court-appointed counsel in non-capital cases in the absence of
special circumstances, it is apparently a violation of due process in all criminal
cases, regardless of the circumstances, to deny an opportunity to obtain coun-
sel of one's own choice.12 The result of this doctrine is that a man has the
fundamental right to the service of an attorney only if he can procure one
on his own. Due process thus depends on the size of a man's pocketbook. In
fact, it seems likely that equal protection of the laws is denied where the de-
fendant is not represented by counsel because of indigence.13
With the states left pretty much at large in non-capital cases, a considera-
tion of the right to counsel as interpreted by state courts is of great im-
portance. Professor Beaney finds that notwithstanding variations in word-
ing and phrasing the state courts have generally construed state constitu-
tional provisions respecting counsel to mean nothing more than the right to
appear in court with retained counsel. 14 Most states, however, have tried to
solve the problem by statute. All provide for appointment in capital cases
and at least thirty-four require it in all felony prosecutions. But these pro-
visions are diluted in many instances by the additional requirement that de-
fendant request counsel-failure to request being deemed a waiver.16 Pro-
fessor Beaney feels that the chief problems have arisen from state courts'
eagerness to discover a waiver, their failure to grant continuances to permit
adequate preparation for trial, and their unwillingness to entertain claims of
incompetent representation. 10 He predicts that the ambiguity of the "fair
trial" test will eventually force the states to adopt measures approximating
the right enjoyed in federal trials under the sixth amendment. He recom-
mends that the states adopt provisions similar to federal rule 44.17
In his chapter entitled "Right to Counsel in Practice" Professor Beaney
discusses and evaluates the various methods of providing counsel for indigent
and unrepresented persons accused of crime. He relies heavily upon Emery
A. Brownell's definitive Legal Aid in the United States (1951) and Martin
12. In the recent case of Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954), the Court in reject-
ing the state's reliance upon Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), said: "But that doc-
trine has no application here. Petitioner did not ask the trial judge to furnish him
counsel; rather, he asked for a continuance so that he could obtain his own. The dis-
tinction is well established in this Court's decisions .... Regardless of whether petitioner
would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard through his
own counsel was unqualified." Id. at 9.
13. Professor Beaney refers to the equal protection argument as an "unusual posi-
tion." P. 197.
14. Only California, New York, Indiana, Georgia, Nevada, New Mexico and Nevada,
according to Professor Beaney, have given their constitutional provisions "an interpreta-
tion comparable to that which the United States Supreme Court gave to the Sixth
Amendment provision in Johnson v. Zerbst." P. 83.
15. For a detailed survey of state provisions regarding the furnishing of counsel in
criminal cases, see Callagy, Legal Aid in Criminal Cases, 42 J. C'mu. L., C. & P.S. 589
(1952).
16. Pp. 138-39.
17. Pp. 140 and 197. Rule 44 is set out at note 5 supra.
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Callagy's report on Legal Aid in Criminal Cases. s Court assignment of
counsel from the local bar is still the most common method of providing legal
assistance for the indigent. In the federal courts there is no provision for
payment of compensation to attorneys assigned to represent defendants. On
the other hand, most states provide, with varying degrees of adequacy, for
payment of fees. Professor Beaney makes two generalizations regarding the
effectiveness of the assigned counsel system. First, in murder cases indigent
defendants have commonly received adequate representation. "[T]he notori-
ety, the opportunity for personal publicity as well as public service, and the
fascination of defending the life of an accused have combined to make many
able and experienced attorneys available for the defense in such cases.
(Whether this has proved true, however, in certain communities where racial
tension exists is doubtful.)" 19 "The second generalization is that in rural or
small-town communities the concern of the bar and the people has been more
evident, and a real effort to provide counsel has been the rule.i 20 It there-
fore follows that the problem of providing counsel in non-capital cases is
essentially an urban one. In the author's opinion, the solution lies in accept-
ing one of two alternatives to the present assignment system: the assignment
of "voluntary defenders" from legal-aid bureaus, or the public defender sys-
tem.
Six out of every ten defendants in criminal cases are unable to employ
counsel. "In 1947 an estimated 97,000 persons who could not afford a la.y'er
faced prosecution on serious criminal charges of a type classified in many
states as felonies. Not more than 22,000 were assisted by public or voluntary
defender organizations. Approximately 36,000 received the frequently inade-
quate services of assigned private counsel, and at least 38,000 went without
any form of Legal Aid whatever." 21 These figures mean that more than one-
half of the indigent criminal defendants facing serious charges must meet
those charges without the help of a lawyer or with assistance so inadequate
as to be virtually worthless.2 2  Surely a wealthy nation committed to egali-
18. 42 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 589 (1952). Professor Beaney also "observed court
proceedings and... interviewed lawyers, trial judges, and members of prosecutors' staffs
in order to gain insights which the printed page inevitably denies." P. v.
19. P. 213.
20. Ibid.
2L BaowxTELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1951).
22. Where a defendant has a right to counsel he also has a corollary right to com-
petent counsel. Thus in federal and state prosecutions the defendant must have "effective"
assistance of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,71 (1932). But appellate courts have
taken a suspicious attitude towards claims of ineffective and incompetent representation.
The defendant must show that the performance of court appointed counrsel v as of such
a low order as to amount to no representation at all. "An extreme case must be shovn."
Soulia v. O'Brien, 94 F. Supp. 764, 770 (D. Mass. 1950). Cf. People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d
437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954). And where the defendant has selected his own attorney the
courts hold, almost without exception, that the failure of such counsel to exercise care
and skill in the trial of the casedoes not afford a basis for upsetting the conviction. Cf.
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tarian principles which it has implemented by extensive economic, political,
and social legislation can afford decent treatment for its poor who face loss
of life or liberty in criminal proceedings. Perhaps the public defender system
-now being proposed for the federal courts-or the "voluntary defender"
employed by a charitable corporation is the best overall solution of the prob-
lem of defending indigent defendants. However, neither should be the ex-
clusive method for providing counsel. It has always been a proud and honor-
able tradition of the bar to accept assignments by the court to defend clients
unable to retain their own lawyers. This tradition should be nourished and
the courts should retain the power to assign counsel in any case where they
believe a public defender or private defender organization cannot adequately
represent a defendant. Provision should also be made for a modest per diem
as compensation-modest, because the bar must be willing to accept some part
of the burden involved in the administration of justice.
"Unpopular cause" cases would be the ones most likely to warrant the
assignment of counsel. Although many public defenders present vigorous and
searching defenses, would a public defender representing a Communist de-
fendant accused of advocating the overthrow of the Government by force
contend that the Communist party is innocent of any such intentions? Would
a public defender be likely to attack a jury selection system approved by the
judge who appointed him?
But a defender system supplemented by compensated, appointed counsel in
special cases is not enough. To make the right to counsel meaningful and
effective, legislation should include the following:
1. An indigent defendant in a criminal trial should be entitled, at gov-
ernment expense, to a copy of the stenographic transcript.
2. An indigent defendant in a criminal case should be reimbursed for
all out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred in his defense, including
expert witness fees.
3. A defendant, even though not impecunious, if found not guilty, should
be reimbursed for reasonable expenses including a fair attorney's fee. A
United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954). One of the most extreme cases
is Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) : "The most that can be said
for this testimony is that it establishes that appellee's counsel drank throughout the trial
and that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a greater or less degree
during the whole trial. But what of it? Appellee employed him; he paid him a sub-
stantial fee, and had a right to his services if he desired them, even though he might
have been under the influence of intoxicants." Id. at 967.
Some courts hold court appointed counsel to a higher standard than counsel selected
by the defendant. People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954). This distinction
is difficult to support. It is not applied where a defendant claims he was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest on the part of counsel
representing two different defendants. Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir.
1954). "It is immaterial whether such counsel was appointed by the Court or selected
by the accused, in the absence of facts constituting a waiver of the right." Id. at 359.
For good discussions of the right to competent counsel, see Notes, 47 COLUM. L.
Rav. 115 (1947), 38 MiNN. L. Rv. 667 (1954).
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defendant who is acquitted may nevertheless be ruined financially by the
cost of a trial.23
Professor Beaney makes one other point that warrants brief comment.
Although the Supreme Court has declared that a prisoner "requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel in every step in the proceedings against 1im,"2- the right
to court-appointed counsel has generally been interpreted as applying only to
proceedings in court, and not to preliminary proceedings before a committing
magistrate,25 nor during police interrogation. An accused person sorely needs
the help of a lawyer when he is first arrested and from then on until the
trial. The intervening period is so full of hazards that an accused may lose
any legitimate defense long before he is arraigned and put to trial. Lack of
counsel before trial may very well result in lack of effective counsel at the
trial itself.2 6 In any event, it would seem that the right to court-appointed
counsel should extend to include the preliminary hearing.
One hundred and one years ago Judge Stuart of the Indiana Supreme Court
wrote:
"It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment,
that any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of
counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid. No court could be
respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The defense of
the poor, in such cases is a duty resting somewhere, which vill be at
once conceded as essential to the accused, to the court and to the
public."27
Professor Beaney has demonstrated that to this day in most of the courts
of the United States Judge Stuart's words constitute a statement of an ideal
to be attained, not a description of the law in operation.
RiCHAm C. DOiNNELLYt
23. These suggestions are derived from Cross, "The Assistance of Comel for his
Defense": Is This Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee?, 38 A.B.A.J. 995 (1952).
24. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (1938).
25. Although a defendant is not entitled to have counsel assigned to him under the
Federal Rules in connection with preliminary hearings, he is entitled to be represented
by counsel retained by him, if he so chooses. FEe. R. CRnI. P. 5(b). See Note, 3 UTrAn
L. REv. 224 (1952).
26. In the recent case of Application of Sullivan, 126 F. Supp. 564 (D. Utah 1954),
Chief Judge Ritter held that in a state capital case due process requires assistance of
counsel at the preliminary hearing. Cf. the opinions of Justice Jackson, concurring in the
result in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949), and dissenting in Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949), and Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 66 (1949).
See also Note, 26 IND. L.J. 234 (1951).
27. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854).
1Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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